Contributed Session Fri.2.H 3002

Friday, 13:15 - 14:45 h, Room: H 3002

Cluster 23: Telecommunications & networks [...]

Game theoretic concepts in telecommunications


Chair: Fabian Rodrigo Medel



Friday, 13:15 - 13:40 h, Room: H 3002, Talk 1

Fabian Rodrigo Medel
Optimal regulation with non discriminatory prices in mobile two way access, with call externalities and heterogeneous costumers

Coauthor: Alejandro R. Jofre


The existence of collusion and exclusion in mobile markets, coupled with increased supply in the range of services to the costumers, has led regulators to confront a difficult problem in the search for tools to promote competition in this market. In this sense, there was an oligopolistic market model with multiple wireless services, different types of users and the presence of a market regulator.
The models used is nonlinear market equilibrium in the subgame perfect equilibria among firms (MPEC). Strategic behavior of firms contemplates Nash equilibria and predatory interactions, encompassing most models existing in the literature.
The result was a detailed analysis of regulatory actions of the non-discriminatory call prices of the firms and the impact on social welfare. Obtaining the optimal strategy by the regulator would be through a substantial reduction of access charges, even below the marginal cost of service, facilitating the entry of new competitors by a fair use of the infrastructure of third parties.



Friday, 13:45 - 14:10 h, Room: H 3002, Talk 2

Jonatan Krolikowski
Game theoretic model for the downlink in cellular mobile networks: Nash equilibria and algorithmic convergence

Coauthors: Anastasios Giovanidis, Tobias Harks


In the downlink of multicell wireless networks, a number of mobile stations (MSs) should be assigned to a set of spatially distinct base stations (BSs). Two questions are addressed in our work: Which MS is served by which BS, and how much power it consumes. The aim is to provide sufficient Signal-to-Interference-Noise-Ratios (SINR) with constraints on the power emissions per BS.
A central optimization of these parameters is costly. To this aim we propose a decentralized algorithm based on game theory, whose outcome is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PNE).
The MSs aim at non-cooperatively optimizing their payoff functions. All information necessary to each MS is its channel quality from all the BSs and the current strategy choices of the other MSs.
This problem is more involved than already investigated models of uplink communication scenarios. We show that a PNE cannot be ensured even in small cases, when considering interference between all pairs of BSs and MSs. Simplification leads to versions of the problem as congestion games with player specific payoff functions, thereby showing the existence of PNEs.


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