Invited Session Thu.3.MA 549

Thursday, 15:15 - 16:45 h, Room: MA 549

Cluster 18: Optimization in energy systems [...]

Equilibrium models for electricity markets


Chair: Andy Philpott



Thursday, 15:15 - 15:40 h, Room: MA 549, Talk 1

Pär Holmberg
Supply function equilibria in networks with transport constraints

Coauthor: Andrew Philpott


Transport constraints limit competition and arbitrageurs' possibilities of exploiting price differences between goods in neighbouring markets, especially when storage capacity is negligible. We analyse this in markets where strategic producers compete with supply functions, as in electricity markets. A methodological problem in the past has been that transport constraints introduce kinks in producers' residual demand curves, which often lead to non-existence of Nash equilibria in oligopoly markets. We show that existence of supply function equilibria (SFE) is ensured if demand shocks are sufficently evenly distributed, so that the residual demand curves become sufficiently smooth in expectation.



Thursday, 15:45 - 16:10 h, Room: MA 549, Talk 2

Eddie Anderson
When do supply function equilibria exist?


Despite the substantial literature on supply function equilibria (SFE) in electricity markets, the question of whether or not an SFE exists in pure strategies for an asymmetric problem is a difficult one. In this paper we prove the existence of a supply function equilibrium for a duopoly with asymmetric capacity constrained firms having convex non-decreasing marginal costs, with decreasing concave demand subject to an additive demand shock. The proof is constructive and also gives insight into the structure of the equilibrium solutions.



Thursday, 16:15 - 16:40 h, Room: MA 549, Talk 3

Andy Philpott
Competitive equilibrium and risk aversion in hydro-dominated electricity markets

Coauthors: Michael C. Ferris, Roger J-B Wets


The correspondence of competitive partial equilibrium with a social optimum is well documented in the welfare theorems of economics. These have analogies in perfectly competitive electricity markets when agents maximize profits in a deterministic setting. When the system involves hydro reservoirs with uncertain inflows, the social optimum is the solution to a multi-stage stochastic program. This corresponds to a competitive equilibrium when all agents are risk neutral and share the same view of the future. We explore what happens in this setting when risk-averse agents optimize using coherent risk measures.


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