Friday, 10:30 - 10:55 h, Room: MA 043


Brendan Lucier
Strategyproof mechanisms for competitive influence in social networks

Coauthors: Allan Borodin, Mark Braverman, Joel Oren


Motivated by models of competitive influence spread in networks, we study mechanisms for allocating nodes to self-interested agents with negative externalities. For example, a social network provider may wish to allow advertisers to provide special offers to influential individuals. The advertisers benefit in that product adoption may spread through the network, but a competing product may adversely impact the rate of adoption.
We construct a mechanism for distributing advertisement space to two competing players. The mechanism is not specific to any particular model for influence spread; it applies to most previously-studied models. Our mechanism yields a constant factor approximation to the optimal total product influence, and is strategyproof in the sense that advertisers maximize their expected total product diffusion by reporting their advertising demands truthfully. We also discuss extensions of our mechanism to three or more players under additional restrictions that are satisfied by many models studied in the literature.


Talk 1 of the invited session Fri.1.MA 043
"Algorithmic game theory" [...]
Cluster 8
"Game theory" [...]


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