Friday, 15:15 - 15:40 h, Room: MA 043

 

Martin Hoefer
Contribution games in networks

Coauthor: Elliot Anshelevich

 

Abstract:
Motivated by contribution scenarios in (social) networks, we analyze network contribution games in which each agent in a network has a budget of effort that he can contribute to different collaborative projects or relationships. Depending on the contribution of the involved agents a relationship will flourish or drown, and to measure success we use a reward function for each relationship. Every agent is trying to maximize the reward from all relationships that it is involved in. We consider pairwise equilibria of this game, and characterize the existence, computational complexity, and quality of equilibrium. Our results concern several natural classes of functions such as convex or concave rewards. We also discuss extensions towards altruistic behavior and different local reward sharing rules.

 

Talk 1 of the invited session Fri.3.MA 043
"Analysis of equilibria in noncooperative games" [...]
Cluster 8
"Game theory" [...]

 

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