Thursday, 13:45 - 14:10 h, Room: MA 005


Vasilis Gkatzelis
Truthful mechanisms for proportionally fair allocations

Coauthors: Richard Cole, Gagan Goel


We study the problem of designing mechanisms to allocate a heterogeneous set of divisible goods among a set of agents in a fair manner. We consider the well known solution concept of proportional fairness that has found applications in many real-world scenarios. Although finding a proportionally fair solution is computationally tractable, it cannot be implemented in a truthful manner. To overcome this, in this paper, we give mechanisms which are truthful and achieve proportional fairness in an approximate manner. We use a strong notion of approximation, requiring the mechanism to give each agent a good approximation of its proportionally fair utility. A motivating example is provided by the massive privatization auction in the Czech republic in the early 90s.


Talk 2 of the invited session Thu.2.MA 005
"Efficiency and optimization in games" [...]
Cluster 8
"Game theory" [...]


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