Wednesday, 15:15 - 15:40 h, Room: H 3003A


Alan Holland
Optimising the economic efficiency of monetary incentives for renewable energy investment

Coauthor: Barry O'Sullivan


Many governments have instituted policies to support the increased generation of electricity using renewable energy devices, and there is compelling need to ensure that publicly funded subsidy schemes are operated in a manner that maximizes societal benefit.
We consider the mechanism design problem associated with the rollout of an auction for monetary incentives to support the increased deployment of renewable energy devices. We assume a game-theoretic model with self-interested agents that behave strategically in order to maximize their expected utility. We seek to develop algorithms for the assignment of investment subsidies and determination of payoff that are resilient to the possibility that agents will lie in order to manipulate the outcome for their own benefit. We seek to minimize the maximum cost imposed on any single agent thus ensuring that a wide distribution of subsidies can be expected. This problem is analogous to solving a makespan minimization problem and has associated algorithmic design challenges when we require a mechanism that can support the elicitation of preferences from potentially tens of thousands of agents in public auctions.


Talk 1 of the invited session Wed.3.H 3003A
"Computational sustainability" [...]
Cluster 5
"Constraint programming" [...]


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