Wednesday, 15:45 - 16:10 h, Room: MA 005

 

Cheng Wan
Coalitions in nonatomic network congestion games

 

Abstract:
The work studies coalitions in nonatomic network congestion games.
Suppose that a finite number of coalitions are formed by nonatomic individuals. Having established the existence and the uniqueness of equilibrium both in the nonatomic game without coalitions and in the composite game with coalitions and independent individuals, we show that the presence of coalitions benefits everyone: at the equilibrium of the composite game, the individual payoff as well as the average payoff of each coalition exceeds the equilibrium payoff in the nonatomic game. The individual payoff is higher than the average payoff of any coalition. The average payoff of a smaller coalition is higher than that of a larger one. In the case of unique coalition, both the average payoff of the coalition and the individual payoff increase with the size of the coalition. Asymptotic behaviors are studied for a sequence of composite games where some coalitions are fixed and the maximum size of the remaining coalitions tends to zero. It is shown that the sequence of equilibrium of these games converges to the equilibrium of a composite game played by those fixed coalitions and the remaining individuals.

 

Talk 2 of the invited session Wed.3.MA 005
"Network sharing and congestion" [...]
Cluster 8
"Game theory" [...]

 

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